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
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Western Europe: The Peace Movement After Initial INF Deployment

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An Intelligence Assessment



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EUR 84-10150
July 1984

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Western Europe: The Peace Movement After Initial INF Deployment

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An Intelligence Assessment

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European Issues Division, EURA, []

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**Western Europe:
The Peace Movement After
Initial INF Deployment**

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Key Judgments

*Information available
as of 10 July 1984
was used in this report*

The British, West German, and Italian peace movements have lost some of their strength since the initial deployment of a new generation of nuclear missiles in their countries began in December. They are suffering from disagreements over tactics, growing differences between independent and Soviet-controlled groups, and a decline in public support:

- The West German movement is showing serious internal strains because of disagreements between militants and moderates over tactics and over the role of the Communists in the movement.
- The British peace campaign is adopting a more strident anti-American tone as its anti-INF themes become less effective.
- The weak Italian peace movement has declined even further as a result of the Communist Party's preoccupation with economic issues and local authorities' actions against the international peace camps at Comiso.

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In contrast to the flagging antinuclear campaigns in the three initial basing countries, peace groups in the Netherlands and Belgium—where public sentiment against INF remains strong—are increasing their efforts to influence government policy on cruise missile deployment:

- In the Netherlands, the peace movement can claim at least partial credit for the government's recent effective postponement of a decision on INF basing until November 1985. Peace groups are likely, therefore, to continue strong efforts against INF, and they probably will be able to sustain approximately the current level of anti-INF activity at least until that date.
- Peace groups in Belgium, which have become increasingly active, plan to join forces with Dutch groups in order to reinforce the pressure on the Belgian Government to refuse deployment.

An eventual Dutch decision to accept some or all of the 48 cruise missiles would probably trigger massive protests in the Netherlands, but it probably would have little impact on peace activity in other basing countries. On the other hand, a Dutch refusal to deploy would be regarded by peace groups as a victory and would sharpen pressure on the Belgian Government to follow suit.

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A resurgence of the peace movement in the larger basing countries probably would require the emergence of dramatic new issues, such as a NATO decision to deploy the Enhanced Radiation Warhead or to increase the stockpile of chemical weapons. A major concession from Moscow—such as the destruction of some SS-20s—probably also would boost peace activity, but lesser Soviet gestures—such as a return to the INF negotiations—would only have an impact, in our judgment, if the Soviets were perceived to be more genuinely interested in arms control than the United States. [REDACTED]

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The Soviets are trying to reactivate the peace movement—particularly in West Germany—but they are encountering greater difficulty in influencing independent peace groups because of their rapid fragmentation and growing disillusionment with Moscow's policies. Nevertheless, independent peace groups, believing that formal unity is necessary to maximize their political weight, probably will avoid an open split with Soviet-controlled organizations. [REDACTED]

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Without new issues as rallying points, the peace movement is likely to become smaller, but it probably will endure because it reflects concerns which go beyond INF. In addition to continuing their antimissile campaign, peace groups are likely to focus on nuclear-weapons-free zones, protection of the environment, international human rights, and US policy in Central America. In the longer term, however, street protest probably will become less important than conventional political activity. [REDACTED]

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We believe that increased democratization of defense policymaking in West European countries will be the peace movement's lasting legacy. West European governments can no longer make defense policy primarily on the basis of expert advice. They feel compelled to take account of public concern about the escalating arms race and to refute accusations from opposition and peace movement spokesmen that they are subservient to the United States. They have already been putting more emphasis on arms control and less emphasis on defense programs than Washington would prefer. Particularly over the next year or two, NATO cooperation will be difficult to achieve on a wide range of issues. [REDACTED]

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Western Europe: The Peace Movement After Initial INF Development

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Introduction

The failure of the United States and the Soviet Union to reach agreement in the Geneva INF negotiations last fall prompted peace groups to make a desperate attempt to persuade government leaders in West Germany, the United Kingdom, and Italy to reject the deployment portion of the 1979 dual-track decision, scheduled to begin in December 1983. During "Action Week" last October several million protesters marched through the streets of Western Europe, but their efforts were in vain. Parliamentary debates during the following month in the three countries confirmed NATO's decision, and the missiles arrived on schedule.

The bitter defeat has dampened the peace movement's fervor. With the exception of the Netherlands—where the government's recent postponement of a decision on deployment until next year is likely to embolden the movement—and Belgium—where peace groups have intensified their protests to influence cabinet decisions on INF—demonstrations have become fewer and have failed to attract large-scale support. Even the traditional Easter protests disappointed organizers' hopes for a new start. The weakening of the peace movement, in our judgment, can be attributed mainly to weariness among its adherents, a decline in media interest, and the lack of new issues with the same rallying potential as INF. Disagreements over tactics and growing friction between "independent" and Communist groups also have taken their toll on the movement.

Recent public opinion polls show that popular attitudes toward INF in the basing countries mirror the trends in peace activism. In West Germany and the United Kingdom, the importance of nuclear weapons as a public issue has decreased. Although there are no recent polls gauging popular sentiment in Italy, we believe that, judging by the media's growing neglect of the missile issue, public interest in INF is on the wane there as well. By contrast, popular opposition to cruise missile deployment continues to be high in the Netherlands, and it has surged in Belgium:

- In West Germany, a Harris poll taken in June found that the percentage of respondents citing the threat of war as a major concern has fallen from 28 percent last December to 14 percent this June. Moreover, opposition to nuclear weapons went down from 38 percent to 15 percent during the same six-month period.
- In the United Kingdom, a Marplan poll taken in May indicated that popular opposition to INF had risen to 55 percent from 50 percent a month earlier, but a Mori poll taken in June showed that the intensity of opposition had declined. When asked to rank the most important concerns in the United Kingdom, only 30 percent of the respondents considered nuclear weapons the paramount issue compared to 41 percent in January.
- In the Netherlands, a USIA-commissioned poll taken in May showed that 49 percent of the respondents opposed cruise missile deployment—only a slight decline from the 52 percent measured by other polling firms in March. Moreover, a poll in early June showed that 59 percent of the respondents supported the government's effective postponement of a decision on INF.
- In Belgium, the May USIA poll placed INF opposition at 59 percent, a substantial increase over the 43 percent measured by another poll last November.

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We believe that, barring new developments in the INF debate, the intensity—and possibly the level—of popular opposition to the NATO missiles in the major basing countries may continue to decline while anti-INF sentiment in the Netherlands and Belgium is likely to remain strong. This probably will weaken further the peace movements in West Germany, the United Kingdom, and Italy and embolden those in the smaller basing countries.

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Organization of the West European Peace Movement

West Germany

The West German peace movement, the continent's largest, is also the most chaotic and multifaceted. Since 1981, hundreds of peace groups have appeared and disappeared, changed their names, or been replaced by other organizations. Church-related groups include Action Sign Atonement/Peace Service (ASF), which is affiliated with the Evangelical Church, and the Action Society Service for Peace (AGDF)—the two original sponsors of the Bonn demonstration in October 1981 that made the peace movement's reputation. [REDACTED]

The environmental movement has provided the peace movement with another pool of recruits through the Federal Association of Citizens' Initiatives for the Protection of the Environment (BBU) and the Green Party. Josef Leinen, a BBU leader, is currently the chairman of the peace movement's coordinating committee. Green Party personalities like Petra Kelly and Gert Bastian have received extensive media coverage, and in the 1983 federal election they and their colleagues rode the antinuclear issue into the Bundestag. [REDACTED]

Communist-influenced groups have played an important role in the West German peace movement. The West German Communist Party (DKP) often participates directly in planning peace activity with non-Communist groups. Often the DKP calls on front organizations such as the German Peace Union (DFU), the German Peace Society—United Conscientious Objectors (DFG-VK), and the Committee for Peace, Disarmament, and Cooperation (KFAZ) for support at coordination committee meetings. The DKP and its fronts also have provided much of the logistics for peace activities, arranging for transportation, printing of literature, and the like. [REDACTED]

Youth groups such as the Young Socialists (Jusos), an organ of the Social Democratic Party, have also contributed to the peace movement. The Jusos,

however, are tame in comparison with some of the more anarchic "autonomous groups" whose anti-establishment attitudes have often led them to espouse rioting and violence. [REDACTED]

United Kingdom

By far the most influential peace group in the United Kingdom is the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND), which first flourished during the "Ban the Bomb" campaigns of the late 1950s and early 1960s. CND has successfully organized several mass demonstrations in London and numerous smaller activities at military bases. Many of the antinuclear activists inside and outside of CND come from the Labor Party, which during the past few years has adopted several of the movement's antinuclear ideas. Another large group of peace activists have come to the movement via the churches; Bruce Kent, CND's former general secretary, is a Roman Catholic priest. The far left, including the small British Communist Party, also is active in the movement. [REDACTED]

CND's lack of success in blocking cruise missile deployment has encouraged the coalescence of groups committed to more confrontational tactics. One radical group called Summit '84 quarreled with CND over tactics to pursue during President Reagan's visit to London in June. The size and influence of such groups, however, remain small. [REDACTED]

Greenham Common, where cruise missiles are being deployed, is a major focus of peace activity. A feminist peace group not directly associated with CND has maintained a "peace camp" near the base since 1981. The women's determined efforts to obstruct and, at times, penetrate the base have gained substantial publicity for the movement. Their morale reportedly has declined somewhat, however, since police forced them to move their camp farther from the base this spring. [REDACTED]

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Italy

The peace movement in Italy does not have a strong, independent institutional base. Although there is a coordinating committee with a cadre of nonpartisan peace activists, most activity of any import depends on the participation of the Italian Communist Party, the Communist wing of the CGIL labor federation, and Catholic church groups for which "peace" is only one area of interest. [REDACTED]

The cruise missile base in Comiso, Sicily, has been the scene of activity by some locally based groups. The most active has been the Unitary Committee for Disarmament and Peace (CUDIP), which is composed mainly of Communist Party members. An international peace camp made up largely of West German, Dutch, and British activists has vied with CUDIP for the spotlight in Comiso. Last year, the two formed the International Meeting Against Cruise (IMAC) and vowed to cooperate more effectively, but tensions persist. [REDACTED]

The Netherlands

The most influential peace group in the Netherlands is the Interchurch Peace Council (IKV), which was created by nine religious denominations in 1966 to study peace and human rights issues. Under the leadership of Mient-Jan Faber, the organization began to focus in the late 1970s almost exclusively on nuclear weapons issues and soon became the principal contributor to protest activity. The IKV has played a major role in organizing massive demonstrations in Amsterdam and The Hague. The media commonly seek out Faber as the peace movement's main spokesman on nuclear weapons issues. [REDACTED]

Other participants in the antinuclear scene include Pax Christi Netherlands, a Catholic organization founded in 1948 as one of the 16 chapters of Pax Christi International. In addition to its current work in the peace movement, Pax Christi maintains a strong interest in human rights questions. [REDACTED]

Members and sympathizers of the Dutch Communist Party also play a role in the Dutch peace movement. During the antineutron bomb demonstrations in 1977-78, the Communists had an important influence through groups like the Christians for Socialism and the Joint Committee—Stop the Neutron Bomb/Stop the Arms Race. However, the weight of these organizations in the peace movement has diminished as the IKV and other non-Communist groups have played more active roles. [REDACTED]

Belgium

Flemish peace organizations have been much more active than Walloon groups in linguistically divided Belgium. Major groups based in Flanders include the Flemish Action Committee Against Nuclear Weapons (VAKA), Pax Christi Belgium, the Flemish Christian Labor Union (ACW), and Vrede—all of which are grouped under the Concertation Center for Peace (OCV). US Embassy officials report that, in the French-speaking region of Belgium, the National Action Committee for Peace and Development (CNAPD) is the only peace organization of any significance. Nevertheless, efforts by CNAPD to organize demonstrations around the potential INF base at Florennes in Wallonia have been largely ineffective; such activity remains dependent on assistance from Flemish peace groups. [REDACTED]

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West Germany

The West German peace movement—the largest anti-missile coalition in Western Europe—is suffering from internal dissension that threatens its existence as a mass movement. There is growing resentment over the Communists' disproportionately large influence in the movement. According to US Embassy and West German press reports, a strategy session in Cologne last February nearly broke up because delegates from the German Communist Party (DKP) opposed a Green-sponsored resolution condemning East Germany for jailing its own independent pacifists. Also, Green Bundestag members Petra Kelly and Gert Bastian have withdrawn from the Krefeld Appeal² because the antimissile initiative failed to include the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The Catholic Pax Christi organization, moreover, has ended its cooperation with the southern German peace movement as a result of constant attempts by the DKP and Soviet front organizations to construct one-sided, anti-NATO resolutions. [redacted]

In addition to tensions between independent and Soviet-dominated groups, the movement is divided over tactics. Militants openly call for provocative actions—possibly even violence—to move back into the media spotlight, while moderates insist on peaceful protest to maintain broad popular support. Thus far the peace movement has avoided radicalization. The terrorist fringe, which injected some violence into last fall's demonstrations, appears to have lost interest in the anti-INF campaign. West German police reports indicate that there has been only one INF-related terrorist incident this year. Except for a widely publicized clash between police and a few protesters at a US installation in northern Germany during recent Easter demonstrations, peace activities generally have been peaceful. West German police, however, point to an increase in property destruction perpetrated by peace groups arguing that such actions are not violent since they do not harm human beings. [redacted]

² The Krefeld Appeal is the name given to an initiative launched by the West German peace movement in the city of Krefeld in October 1982. The petition called on the West German Government to reject deployment of cruise missiles and Pershing IIs in Central Europe; as of May 1983 the appeal had collected 4 million signatures. [redacted]

Internal divisions do not necessarily indicate that the peace movement is withering away. The Green Party's surprisingly strong showing in the Baden-Wuerttemberg elections last March and high voter participation in the peace movement's nonbinding referendum on INF during the European Parliament elections reflect a continuing doubt in some segments of the population about NATO strategy. According to Josef Leinen, the peace movement's coordinating committee chairman, the antimissile campaign will continue. Peace groups plan to harass NATO maneuvers in the fall, call teachers' strikes, blockade military bases, and hold torchlight processions. They also will focus on chemical weapons storage—an issue which already is attracting media attention. Leinen admitted, however, that protests will be on a much smaller scale than last fall. [redacted]

The decline in peace movement activity may prompt the Social Democratic Party (SPD), which opposed deployment in last November's parliamentary debate and vote, to modify some of the more radical features of its security policy adopted since its fall from power in late 1982. The SPD congress in May, for example, saw an increased emphasis on domestic issues in contrast to the party's recent obsession with nuclear policy. The congress also endorsed NATO membership. Nonetheless, the security and defense platform includes numerous positions on issues which oppose established NATO policies. Party Chairman Brandt, moreover, encouraged voters to support the peace movement's referendum against INF deployments. Although many SPD leaders would like to deemphasize defense issues, they face strong rank-and-file resistance as well as opposition from their more radical colleagues in the leadership. [redacted]

United Kingdom

The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND)—the principal British peace group—is also having problems. US Embassy officials, who had a candid conversation with CND leaders in May, have reported that the organization is short of funds. This probably means that the CND is losing members since it depends for its finances on member contributions.

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CND leaders also have admitted that they are no longer able to attract crowds as large as in 1982 and 1983, that radical CND elements are gaining ground, and that the media are losing interest in peace activities. []

In a search for new issues to shore up their faltering campaign, peace movement leaders have adopted a more pronounced "anti-American" orientation. The CND sponsored a 170-mile Easter march to call attention to the role American bases would play in a nuclear alert. Its general secretary urged British servicemen in a recent speech to disregard orders relating to US cruise missiles. Antinuclear campaigners also have opposed the US AirLand Battle 2000 concept,³ arguing that enhanced weapon technology foreseen in the concept could be used for offensive operations. Moreover, pacifists have stepped up their protests against the Thatcher government's plan to replace outmoded Polaris submarines with US-built Trident systems, and they staged demonstrations during President Reagan's June visit to give wider publicity to their demands. Protests are also increasing in Scotland, a CND stronghold, where Trident is to be based. The anti-American campaign has boosted the peace movement's appeal to some extent, but thus far it has failed to mobilize people on the same scale as last year's INF protests. []

The CND's unilateral nuclear disarmament campaign has made some inroads into the Liberal-Social Democratic Alliance, but it has had its greatest effect on the Labor Party. It has contributed to Labor leader Neil Kinnock's call for the immediate dismantling of all nuclear weapons in the United Kingdom and cancellation of the Trident program. He has stated furthermore that a future Labor government would reverse INF deployment. Although Prime Minister Thatcher's support for INF deployment remains firm, some government officials are concerned that peace groups will give the issue of control over US missiles

³ "AirLand Battle 2000," a US concept paper published in August 1982 and later conveyed to the NATO Allies, contains a preliminary assessment of future battlefield requirements based on projected advances in military technology. It was widely reported (and, we believe, misrepresented) in the press and drew sharp criticism from the political left in Western Europe. Critics attacked the study's alleged emphasis on (1) a more "offensive" posture (for example, its advocacy of deep attack of the Warsaw Pact's follow-on forces) and (2) the integration of conventional, nuclear, and chemical warfare operations on a future battlefield. []

Table 1
British Attitudes on
Dual-Key Controls

Percent

	Total	Voting Intention		
		Conservative	Labor	Alliance
Favor dual key	78	83	70	81
Oppose	13	10	20	12
Don't know	9	7	10	7

in the United Kingdom—the "dual key" issue—increased prominence. A recent public opinion poll showed that 78 percent of the respondents favored dual key control, even if it cost the billion pounds Defense Secretary Heseltine said it would (table 1). []

Italy

Public opinion surveys from 1981 through last fall have shown that Italy has the highest rate of opposition to INF of any prospective basing country. Except for three large demonstrations in Rome over the past three years, however, the peace movement has been unable to tap this seemingly promising resource. Since cruise missile deployment began in Sicily last December, the lack of activity in other regions has been especially apparent. Moreover, the arrest of some peace activists and closure of three peace camps near the Comiso missile site—although subsequently overturned in the courts—may presage a new government policy that will make peace activity in the neighborhood more difficult. []

Several factors have militated against a strong Italian peace movement. The Communist Party, the main architect of the large peace demonstrations that have occurred, has lent its organizational support to the movement only selectively. The Communists' desire to promote their image as a responsible party and to benefit from the electoral decline of the Christian Democratic Party has made them increasingly circumspect about antimissile protests. Moreover, the

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government's repeated efforts to modify the automatic wage adjustment system have induced the Communist Party to pay more attention to economic concerns than to the missile issue. The peace movement has also failed to obtain a clear endorsement from the trade union federations—except for the Communist faction of the CGIL. Nor has the church been consistently helpful; few Catholic churchmen have voiced uncompromising opposition to the US missiles.

The Italian peace movement, like those in West Germany and the United Kingdom, is frantically searching for new issues. Last March, pacifists at an Arab-financed international conference in Palermo maintained that Washington's Middle East policy and Israel—as well as Comiso's cruise missiles—threaten the peace of the world and particularly that of the Mediterranean region.

Nuclear opponents have failed to make Prime Minister Craxi reverse his decision on deployment, but he and a number of high-ranking officials close to him continue to hope for a US-Soviet missile agreement that would halt deployment. Craxi's recent suggestion in Lisbon that the NATO Allies consider offering the Soviets a moratorium on deployment probably can be explained in part by his belief that the West must, at a minimum, be perceived to be genuinely interested in a settlement.

The Netherlands

In the Netherlands, the government's substantial retreat⁴ from its 1979 commitment is likely to embolden the peace movement. Peace movement leaders initially criticized the government's new position as a disguised decision to accept the NATO missiles, but we believe the antinuclear Labor Party and the peace movement recognize and will fully exploit the potentially contradictory features of the government's plan.

⁴ On 31 May, the Dutch Government announced that the Netherlands would deploy a proportional share of missiles in 1988 under a US-Soviet agreement reducing INF, if such an agreement had been reached by then. If no agreement is reached and the Soviets further increase global SS-20 levels, the Netherlands have indicated that they will begin full deployment—48 cruise missiles. However, a formal agreement between the United States and the Netherlands setting out the conditions for deployment must still be presented to Parliament in November 1985. This opens at least a possibility of outright rejection or further postponement even if conditions specified for deployment are fulfilled.

In particular, peace groups will view the creation of another decision point—including a parliamentary vote—in November 1985 as another opportunity to kill the program in the Netherlands. Moreover, with deployment in effect precluded before 1988, they will be heartened by the possibility that the Labor Party could come to power in the interim. Labor leaders have confirmed that they will seek to reverse any positive INF basing decision if their party enters the government.

The Interchurch Peace Council (IKV)—the principal Dutch peace group—during the past year has successfully lobbied politicians and other opinion leaders. Its pressure on Christian Democratic members of Parliament, in our opinion, was partially responsible for the government's inability to make a basing decision this spring. Moreover, the Calvinist Church Synod and the Dutch Council of Churches issued statements opposing INF deployment in the Netherlands. The decision of the Dutch Council was particularly important for the peace movement because it includes the Catholic Church, whose pastoral letters have avoided a stand against deployment.

Peace groups also have received support from the Dutch Socialist Trade Union Federation and the center-left Democrats '66 Party. Abandoning its previously aloof stance, the federation encouraged its members to participate in a 15-minute work stoppage for peace in mid-May. The Democrats '66 announced that they will definitely vote against INF deployment in Parliament.

Although support for the peace movement's goals is growing, tensions are developing within the movement. IKV leader Mient-Jan Faber recently shocked other peace group leaders by stating publicly that the peace movement should accept limited INF deployment in the Netherlands if it is part of an arms control process leading to a complete elimination of INF from Western Europe. Faber's new pragmatism, in our view, reflects his concern that uncompromising anti-INF positions might keep peace groups from influencing government arms control policy. Nevertheless, Faber is likely to modify his stand to avoid serious divisions in the movement that would undercut its effectiveness.

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Belgium

In the Belgian peace movement, Flemish groups have been more active than their Walloon counterparts despite the location of the designated missile site, Florennes, in Wallonia. More recently, however, the Walloon peace movement has picked up some momentum as a result of organizational support from the francophone Socialists and the Federation of Belgian Workers. The Secretariat of the National Action Committee for Peace and Development (CNAPD)—the principal francophone peace organization—has urged the Belgian Government to delay the basing decision until the superpowers are willing to engage in serious arms control negotiations. Its action plan for 1984 calls for joining forces with Dutch peace groups because of the similar situations in Belgium and the Netherlands. The CNAPD also tied its peace campaign to the European Parliament election with some success. Prime Minister Martens and other Social Christian leaders have attributed their party's losses to the INF issue. []

Like missile opponents in other basing countries, Belgian pacifists are divided over the question of whether protest should be strictly lawful or whether it should take the form of civil disobedience. Most peace groups, fearing that unlawful actions would diminish popular support for their goals and dilute the pressure on government, have rejected civil disobedience. The Flemish Action Committee against Atomic Weapons (VAKA), however, has proposed that its members refuse to pay part of their income tax as a sign of protest. The VAKA leadership, nevertheless, is moving cautiously on this suggestion. []

So far, the relatively low level of peace activity has made it easier for the center-right coalition government to continue support for INF and even begin base construction at Florennes. However, the recent equivocal decision by the Dutch may incline Brussels to postpone a definitive and public authorization for deployment. We believe the government may even delay the basing decision until after the national election in 1985 to enhance its reelection prospects. []

Other NATO Countries

France appears to be relatively immune to the West European peace campaign. Although there have been a few mass demonstrations—mostly orchestrated by

the French Communist Party—there is no peace movement comparable to those in the basing countries. The fact that France is not an INF basing country, in our view, only partially explains the virtual lack of a French antinuclear debate. The French also are less vulnerable to pacifist temptations because they perceive their own nuclear deterrent as serving French rather than foreign interests. Moreover, according to a 1983 survey by the highly respected French polling firm Sofres, a marked shift of opinion has occurred on the question of how West European governments should respond to the Soviet arms build-up. In September 1983, a plurality (48 percent to 42 percent) favored a policy of firmness rather than conciliation toward the Soviet Union. In February 1981, a majority (52 percent) had favored the conciliatory approach, with less than one-third supporting a policy of firmness. The 1983 poll also showed that 57 percent of the respondents believed that the Soviet Union presents the greatest threat to world peace, while only 23 percent held this view of the United States. []

A continuing French consensus on security policy is not fully assured, however. We believe that Mitterrand's unwavering support for INF deployment has brought out latent strains between two groups of politically aware Frenchmen: the "European-Atlanticist" group—including most Socialists, Giscardian centrists, and supporters of Gaullist leader Chirac—supporting European cooperation and the Alliance; and the "nationalist-neutralist" group—including the Communists, some leftwing Socialists, and some orthodox Gaullists—favoring a more "equidistant" position between East and West. The differences between the two groups would sharpen if the "European Atlanticists" showed willingness to accommodate pressures from some European Allies to include the French nuclear forces in future arms control negotiations. []

The peace movement in *Denmark* has been able to maintain its vigor despite initial INF deployment in the major basing countries. Peace campaigners are accusing the Schluter government of not actively working toward the establishment of a Nordic nuclear-weapons-free zone, which a parliamentary

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resolution had mandated last year. The Social Democratic Party (SDP) has slowly drifted leftward on security policy during its two years in opposition, but we believe that the drift may have come to a stop. Nevertheless, the deputy caucus chairman of the SDP recently cofounded an organization called the Friends of Peace Fund in cooperation with the far left, thus breaking an SDP tradition of not lending active support to peace groups. [redacted]

The Parliament, moreover, passed a Social Democratic resolution on 2 May calling for the government to work in NATO and other international organizations for:

- A Nordic nuclear-weapons-free zone, so that Denmark would be free of nuclear weapons in wartime as well as in peacetime.⁴
- A moratorium on the deployment of intermediate-range and short-range missiles to improve the basis for arms control negotiations.
- A freeze on all stocks of nuclear weapons.

US Embassy officials believe that the Parliamentary resolution is softer than previous conversations with SDP chairman Anker Jorgensen had led them to expect. Reflecting divisions within the SDP and the need to reestablish unity, the resolution avoids declaring unilateral Danish positions, but rather directs the government to work through NATO. [redacted]

Shortly after passing the antinuclear resolution, the Parliament also voted to stop INF infrastructure payments. The measure was passed with the votes of the SDP and two smaller leftist parties while the government abstained. The government is now working with NATO to use the \$4.8 million in question for "purely Danish" defense communications facilities rather than a NATO INF project. [redacted]

Norway's principal antinuclear group "No to Nuclear Weapons" (NTA) has emphasized the same issues as Danish leftists. Since the onset of INF deployment, NTA has had some difficulty mobilizing people on behalf of its causes. Nevertheless, the "nuclear freeze" and "no first use" themes enjoy support from

⁴ Under present arrangements with NATO, Denmark has no nuclear weapons in peacetime, but they could be brought in during war. [redacted]

groups across the political spectrum. According to the US Embassy, the Christian People's Party is debating adopting these themes, and there is also considerable sympathy for them in the Center Party. [redacted]

The small peace movement in *Spain* has focused primarily on Spanish membership in NATO and the presence of US bases, arguing that both expose Spaniards to unnecessary risks during wartime. In Greece, peace groups have advocated a Balkan nuclear-weapons-free zone—a concept fervently supported by Prime Minister Papandreou. At a recent peace conference in Athens, Papandreou not only pleaded for denuclearized zones, but he also repudiated all research and development efforts aimed at building new advanced weapon systems. [redacted]

The Soviet Response

Concerned about the flagging peace activity in the major INF-basing countries, the Soviet Union has sought to revitalize the antinuclear movement through increased efforts by European Communist parties and Soviet front organizations. Moscow's ability to orchestrate the peace movement has declined, however, because of mainstream peace groups' disillusionment with Soviet foreign and domestic policies and because of their annoyance about excessive Soviet meddling in peace conferences:

- No prominent Western political leaders or peace movement spokesmen attended a January meeting of the Soviet-dominated International Liaison Forum of Peace Forces in Stockholm. The meeting was designed to galvanize Western support for a March rally in Stockholm to coincide with the Conference on Disarmament in Europe.
- British and Dutch delegates threatened to boycott the International Conference on the Denuclearization of Europe in Athens last February after the deputy chairman of the World Peace Council, Yuri Zukhov, demanded that participants refrain from criticizing Soviet defense policy and after he told the conference's organizers not to invite unofficial East European and Soviet peace activists. The meeting ended in open disagreement over the one-sided pro-Soviet draft communique and failed to publish a joint statement.

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- The West Berlin Communist Party (SEW) was unable to organize a large demonstration in central West Berlin on 8 May to commemorate "Liberation Day." According to the SEW's best estimates, the demonstration attracted only about 800 participants compared to approximately 60,000 in 1982 on the same day. Neither the Social Democratic Party nor the German Trade Union Federation supported the demonstration. [REDACTED]

These setbacks to Soviet interests have prompted Moscow to shift tactics. The Moscow-controlled World Peace Council (WPC) has decided to participate in the third European Nuclear Disarmament (END) convention scheduled for late July in Perugia, Italy. The WPC boycotted last year's END convention in West Berlin because of the organization's insistence on criticizing both the United States and the Soviet Union. [REDACTED]

WPC intends to avoid divisive issues and emphasize peace movement unity and cooperation at the Perugia meeting. To maximize Moscow's impact on the convention, WPC officials have urged END to increase their organization's allotment of delegates. They also have proposed WPC members as speakers on topics that hold particular interest for the Soviets—such as nuclear-weapons-free zones—and they hope to "pack" discussion groups with people sympathetic to the Soviet line. [REDACTED]

Outlook

The West European peace movement, despite its fractionalization, is likely to endure because it reflects social and security concerns that go beyond INF deployment. Its ability to expand again into a powerful mass movement, however, would depend on the emergence of dramatic issues of immediate concern to West Europeans—such as a NATO decision to deploy Enhanced Radiation Warheads or to increase the stockpile of chemical weapons. The peace movement could also receive new life from a major Soviet concession—such as the destruction of some SS-20s. Less dramatic moves—such as a Soviet return to the INF negotiations—would spark renewed peace activity if Moscow were perceived to be more genuinely interested in arms control than Washington. [REDACTED]

Moscow undoubtedly will continue to try to undermine public support for INF, particularly in West Germany. Its ability to manipulate or influence West German antinuclear groups, however, is likely to

suffer because of their rapid fragmentation and their growing disenchantment with Soviet policy. At a recent national conference, West German independent groups decided to limit their cooperation with Communist organizations in the future. However, formal unity is still very important to the West German movement, and an open split is unlikely. [REDACTED]

Dutch Government actions could also have an impact on the peace movement. We believe that peace activists throughout Western Europe would regard a final Dutch rejection of INF deployment as a victory to be exploited. Such a decision probably would boost peace activity in Belgium substantially, and, to some extent, in the larger basing countries as well. With the possible exception of Belgium, however, deployments would be well under way and probably would not be stopped in the absence of new governments more sympathetic to peace movement goals. A definitive Dutch decision to accept INF basing probably would create massive protests in the Netherlands, but it would bolster the confidence of governments in other basing countries and discourage the peace groups confronting them. [REDACTED]

Since INF deployments in the basing countries will occur periodically until 1988, peace groups are likely to continue their campaign against the NATO missiles, but, without new issues as rallying points, its scope and intensity will be much reduced. Street protests, in our judgment, may become less important than traditional political activity. Peace movement literature also suggests that antinuclear groups plan to place greater emphasis on "peace research" and conferences to keep the peace issue alive on the intellectual level. [REDACTED]

Although some observers of the peace movement fear that activists' frustration over their failure to prevent deployment may precipitate a radicalization of the movement, we expect protests to remain generally peaceful. Extremists no doubt will continue to call for civil disobedience, such as blocking military bases, or even violence, such as clashes with police. Most peace movement leaders, however, reject unlawful activities because they would alienate the public. Polls taken

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
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Figure 1
November 1983 Polls: Opinions
About the Peace Movement




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last November indicate that a continuation of civil disobedience tactics would reduce public approval of the antinuclear movement by half or more and that violent actions would eliminate nearly all of the remaining support (figure 1).

Independent West European groups probably will try to expand their ties with "authentic" peace movements in Eastern Europe, but their attempts are not likely to be very successful because of the effective control of East European governments over Western contacts with dissident groups. Members of the West German Greens, for example, left the Prague Peace Assembly last July after Czechoslovak authorities refused to let them continue a meeting with Charter 77 dissidents and a group of Czechoslovak writers.

Peace groups probably will keep up their efforts to establish nuclear-weapons-free zones and ultimately to bring about the dissolution of military blocs. The concept of nuclear-weapons-free zones enjoys great popularity among West European publics. According

Figure 2
November 1983 Polls: Opinions
About Nuclear Issues



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to one recent poll, nearly 50 percent of West German and Belgian respondents would vote for denuclearization of their own country if a national referendum were held, while in the Netherlands and Italy, 50 percent and 72 percent, respectively, would vote in the affirmative (figure 2). Thus far, however, peace groups have not been able to translate this sentiment into large-scale protests.

The peace movement—particularly in West Germany—is likely to broaden its perspective beyond security issues by paying greater attention to protection of the environment, labor union causes, and international human rights. The West German Greens, for instance, are already returning to their earlier emphasis on environmental concerns, such as industrial pollution, nuclear reactors, and poisonous chemical wastes. They also joined West German labor groups in fighting for the 35-hour workweek. In April, Green members demonstrated their support for human rights by protesting prison conditions in Turkey.

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West European peace groups probably also will focus more on US policies in Central America. In the minds of pacifists, both INF deployment and US intervention in Central America are expressions of US "imperialism and militarism." According to US diplomatic reports, peace demonstrations increased after Washington's intervention in Grenada. Some members of West European antinuclear groups also have shown their solidarity with the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua by participating in the country's coffee harvest. Although seizing upon ad hoc issues may help the movements counteract the attrition of the past few months, in our judgment, some of the urgency that formerly characterized antinuclear activity will be lost.


Remaining Concerns for the United States

Greater public participation in security debates has become an important feature of West European politics. As a result, defense policymaking is no longer the prerogative of a handful of experts. While the trend toward broadened participation was evident before the INF controversy reached its height, the peace movement skillfully built its power on growing public concern about defense policy and made public opinion a factor that governments cannot ignore. Even if the peace movement wanes, we believe that participatory policymaking in defense will be its lasting legacy.

The publicity given to the peace movement's claims over the past few years has, in our judgment, contributed to the lack of confidence among West European publics in Washington's ability to deal responsibly with world problems. Public opinion polls taken last December show that a majority of Britons and large pluralities of West Germans and Italians believe that recent US policies have increased the risk of war. According to these polls, the US arms control image among the public as a whole is not very much better than that of the Soviet Union (figure 3 and table 2).

In charting future defense policies, West European governments will need to take account of popular concerns about the escalating arms race and to refute charges from opposition parties and peace movement spokesmen that they have become subservient to the United States. As a result, we believe most governments will be inclined to blend assertiveness and

Figure 3
British and West German Public Confidence
in US Foreign Policy, 1981-83



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caution in their approach to security issues. They will be assertive when it comes to arms control and other areas where they can be seen to be pushing the United States rather than following its lead; they will be cautious when it comes to new, possibly controversial NATO modernization programs, particularly when proposed by the United States:

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Table 2
Results of Public Opinion Polls:
US and USSR Arms Control Images

Percent

	October 1982	April 1983	June 1983	July 1983	December 1983
USSR Arms Control Image					
West Germany					
USSR is:					
Sincere	19	36	30	39	24
Not sincere	53	37	32	31	46
United Kingdom					
USSR is:					
Sincere	14	19	21	35	19
Not sincere	64	62	65	45	64
US Arms Control Image					
West Germany					
United States is:					
Sincere	38	61	50	55	50
Not sincere	36	21	20	22	26
United Kingdom					
United States is:					
Sincere	32	54	51	61	43
Not sincere	49	36	40	29	46

- Since December, West European leaders have continued to press the United States to be as flexible as possible about returning to negotiations with the USSR—including new talks on antisatellite and space weapons. Similarly, many Allies—including West Germany—have been pushing the United States to be more forthcoming in MBFR and CDE.
- The West Europeans seem well on their way toward a revitalization of the Western European Union, in part because it is a low-cost way to assert their independence. Defense cooperation in the WEU could strengthen NATO by drawing France closer to the Alliance, but it could weaken NATO if it permits the West Europeans to arrive at unified policy positions challenging US viewpoints.

- The West Germans have already expressed qualms about US plans to modernize chemical weapons in Western Europe and have urged instead the negotiation with the Soviet Union of a production and storage ban on such weapons. Some West German officials have also taken a lead in cautioning against Washington's plans for a space-based missile defense system. Defense Minister Woerner has argued that such a system could be destabilizing and could decouple West European security from that of the United States.

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In essence, the leaders of the major NATO countries will be grappling with a formidable task in the months ahead. The European Allies must rebuild the security consensus damaged by the INF controversy, and in doing so they will take account of the public concerns embodied in the peace movement. We believe that this effort—combined with continuing budgetary pressures—will often lead the West Europeans to put more emphasis on arms control and less emphasis on defense programs than the United States would prefer, making NATO cooperation difficult to achieve on a wide range of issues. If the peace movement continues to decline and if a moderate security consensus begins to emerge, this problem could ease after the next year or two. But public interest in security issues is likely to be a permanent constraint on NATO policymaking.

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